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URBAN SOCIAL INSURANCE AND WORKER
SATISFACTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
Mita Bhattacharya, Ingrid Nielsen, Chris Nyland,
Russell Smyth and Mingqiong Zhang*
This paper draws on a unique survey of urban employees in Jiangsu that was
designed to assist analysis of workers’ satisfaction with the urban social insurance
scheme in China, and sheds light on whether workers in the urban non-state sector
are satisfied with the level of social insurance coverage and whether their perceptions
compare favourably with workers in the state-owned sector. It also discusses the
globalisation and social protection debate in India and draws implications for the
Indian experience from both our perception research and China’s experience with
urban social insurance reform more generally.
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the commencement of market reform in the 1980s China maintained a comprehensive,
enterprise-based social protection regime for workers employed in collectively-owned (COEs)
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This welfare system was known as ‘cradle to grave
socialism’ or the ‘iron rice bowl’ and was made possible by the fact that the Communist Party
drew its primary support from the urban working class and hence was willing to have the
peasantry cross-subsidise this section of China’s population (Kwong, 2003, p.188). Under this
regime, public sector workers received free pension insurance and health services, paid
sickness leave, maternity benefits, food and funeral subsidies and insurance for injury, death or
disability. In addition, enterprises provided a range of other free services including housing and
cultural and recreational facilities such as libraries, schools, barbershops and bathhouses
(Ishihara, 1993). In the 1980s cracks in the iron rice bowl began to emerge as it became clear
that comprehensive social welfare coverage for employees in the public sector was
incompatible with a form of development in which the Chinese proletariat had to become
mobile, was rendered vulnerable to domestic and global market volatility, and was no longer
regarded as the “ruler of society”.
One pressing problem that emerged with the turn to the market was the fact that with cradle
to grave socialism, benefits were restricted to those working in SOEs and COEs and did not
extend to workers employed in the urban non-state sector. This was not a major problem prior
to the commencement of market reforms because the urban non-state sector was relatively
small and welfare in the rural sector was catered for by the commune system. However, with
the beginning of market reforms rural welfare structures, particularly in the area of health care,
collapsed while the number of non-state urban workers began to experience a high rate of
steady growth (Rosner, 2004). As a consequence an increasing number of urban workers had
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no social welfare benefits and state sector firms found it increasingly difficult to compete with
private enterprises given the latter’s limited welfare responsibilities. Responding to these
difficulties, from the mid-1980s China initiated a programme of reform that eroded the level of
welfare available to workers in the state-owned sector and concomitantly began increasing the
benefits available to employees in the urban non-state sector. This was a process accelerated
from 1998; the net effect of these developments has been well captured by Duckett (2004,
p.158)—whose contribution has focussed on urban health insurance and she has concluded
that cumulatively the reforms have halted the deterioration in provision even if, at the moment,
there is only commitment to a basic system—thus:
[R]rather than retreating from its commitment to deliver social health insurance, the state has,
through its local governments, taken over from work units the responsibility for organizing,
administering and guaranteeing provisions. [Thus] rather than collectivism being abandoned, it
has been preserved through a new redistributory “risk-pooling” system.
How workers living in urban areas have perceived these changes has been subjected to
sustained analysis. Most perception research, however, has focussed on the declining coverage in
the state sector and has concluded that state workers are convinced both that the government and
the Communist Party have abandoned them and that they are consequently in a dire position. The
focus on the views of workers in the state-owned sector overlooks the perceptions of workers in
the urban non-state sector whose position has been improved as a consequence of the welfare
reforms progressively introduced over the last two decades. The objective of this paper is to shed
light on whether this latter body of workers is satisfied with the level of social insurance coverage
they enjoy and whether their perceptions compare favourably with workers in the state-owned
sector. In brief, this exercise aims to provide a more comprehensive picture of how China’s urban
workers perceive social insurance reforms. To realise our objective we draw on a survey of
workers’ perceptions in 19 enterprises including SOEs, COEs, shareholding firms (SHF), wholly
foreign-owned enterprises (WFOE), private-owned enterprises (POE) and joint ventures (IJV) in
five cities in Jiangsu province, collected in December 2003. Our main hypothesis is that the
increased benefits enjoyed by workers in the urban non-state sector will be reflected in favourable
perceptions of the current welfare regime by those employed in this sector relative to workers in
the public sector.
If this hypothesis proves to be correct, this paints a rather different view of the manner in
which the social insurance reforms have been viewed by urban workers than exists in those
extant studies that have mainly focussed on the reactions of workers in, or retrenched from,
SOEs and COEs. It may also help explain the high level of satisfaction with the marketisation
process we have elsewhere documented amongst the urban working class of China, a
perspective that does not meld comfortably with studies that suggest that the majority of
workers are very unhappy with their current situation (Nielsen et al., 2005).
II. CHANGING SOCIAL INSURANCE COVERAGE ACROSS OWNERSHIP FORMS
When China commenced its programme of market reforms in the late 1970s SOEs accounted
for 76 per cent of industrial output, COEs produced 23.5 per cent of industrial output and
‘other enterprises’ (IJVs, WFOEs, SHFs and POEs) were responsible for 0.5 per cent of output
(ZTN, 1997, p. 413). Over the next 25 years the importance of SOEs and COEs in terms of
industrial production and employment declined considerably. Table 1 shows the main
indicators of industrial enterprises in China for January to November 2004. SOEs (including
SHFs with state controlling shares) and COEs combined accounted for less than 25 per cent of
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industrial enterprises and just over 40 per cent of employment in industrial firms in China. At
the same time the non-state sector experienced fast growth. Table 1 shows that in 2004 WFOEs
alone were responsible for 20 per cent of industrial enterprises and almost 25 per cent of
employment in industrial enterprises. POEs have experienced similar growth since the late
1990s. According to the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, in the decade
between 1993 and 2002 the number of registered private firms increased from 238,000 to 2.4
million; the number of employees in private enterprises increased from 3.7 million to 34.1
million and total registered capital increased from 68.1 billion RMB to 2,475.6 billion RMB
(Zhang and Liu, 2003). Recognising the increasing importance of private enterprises, in March
2004 the National People’s Congress passed an amendment to the Chinese Constitution giving
private property rights equal status with public property. The amendment to the Constitution
reads that “private property obtained legally shall not be violated” and “will be on an equal
footing with public property” (Sui, 2004; Min, 2004).
The rapid expansion of the urban non-state sector required China’s national and regional
governments to take urgent action if they wished to preserve the urban welfare regime. At the
end of 1994, about 90 per cent of workers in SOEs and 70 per cent of workers in COEs
received social welfare benefits (Ge, 1996) and as a consequence the livelihood of a majority of
urbanites was underpinned by a substantial social protection regime (Duckett, 2004). The
provision of benefits was administered through the work unit with public sector employees
referred to as ‘unit people’ (danwei ren) rather than ‘social people’ (shehui ren). However,
China’s iron rice bowl was incompatible with the changing importance of state and non-state
firms in terms of employment and industrial output. In addition to the lack of social welfare
coverage in the non-state sector, benefits were not portable across ownership forms and in
particular from the state to non-state sector. Cradle to grave socialism placed enormous
Table 1
Main Indicators of Industrial Enterprises in China, January-November 2004
Indicator Unit National State-owned Collective Foreign invested
total or controlled enterprises enterprises
share holding including
industry Greater  China
Number Number % of Number % of Number % of
national national national
total total total
Number of 214611 31682 (14.76) 21117 (9.84) 42089 (19.61)
enterprises
Total assets 100 million 192780.09 101278.13 (52.54) 6879.01 (3.57) 47480.83 (24.63)
RMB
Sales 100 million 167199.97 63758.79 (38.13) 9102.54 (5.44) 51723.79 (30.94)
revenue RMB
Total 100 million 10188.15 4944.47 (48.53) 445.8 (4.38) 3098.16 (30.41)
profits RMB
Value added 100 million 5741.74 3186.76 (55.5) 256.60 (4.47) 1069.78 (18.63)
tax payable RMB
Total number 10000 6028 2041.94 (33.87) 444.73 (7.38) 1430.64 (23.73)
of employees persons
Source: “China Statistical Data”-http://www.china.org.cn/e-company/index.htm. This is a monthly statistics data
base from the National Bureau of Statistics.
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financial pressures on SOEs and the cost of providing comprehensive social welfare was a
major factor responsible for the growth in the number of loss-making SOEs through the market
reform period, when combined with competition from non-state enterprises.
One of the manifestations of market reforms is that SOEs have been forced to lay-off large
numbers of workers. The policy of labour retrenchment in Chinese SOEs was first trialed in
1994 and was launched in 1997. Since that time the number of laid-off (xiagang) workers has
become a major social problem. According to official figures there were 26 million workers
laid off from SOEs between 1998 and 2002 (Armitage, 2003; Burns, 2003). At the beginning
of 2004 Zheng Silin, Minister of Labour and Social Security, announced that the government
anticipates that a further three million workers in the state-owned sector will lose their jobs
each year between 2004 and 2006 (Business Daily Update, 2004). The iron rice bowl method is
antithetical to transferring large numbers of workers out of the state-owned sector because laid-
off workers cutting their ties with their SOE would lose all welfare benefits and there was no
incentive to voluntarily move because workers in the non-state sector received no social
welfare.
The objectives of the new social insurance schemes that began to be introduced with the
expansion of the urban non-state sector was to raise the level of coverage, provide a range of
benefits that can be sustained and that are not dependent on cross subsidisation, and greatly
increase the share of the cost borne by individual urban workers (Zhu et al., 2005, p. 141).
Guan (2000) has described these new arrangements as ‘socialisation’ (shehuihua), that is, a
society-wide system in which urbanites have equal access to a basic level of social insurance
coverage, irrespective of the type of enterprise in which they are employed.
At the 2004 National People’s Congress, at which respect for private property was written
into the Constitution, an amendment was also adopted that requires the government to
construct a nation wide social security system compatible with the nation’s level of economic
development. Solinger (2003, p.959) has observed that views expressed at the Congress and
subsequently, by the new Communist Party leadership, suggest that this Constitutional change
may foreshadow the beginning of a greater effort on the part of the government to improve the
well-being of those who thus far have gained little from marketisation but cautions that
whether this will happen “can only be known with time”.
The national regulations governing the contribution of enterprises and individuals in urban
areas are set out in Table 2, but because China does not have a national social insurance law,
provincial and local governments have formulated detailed rules in accordance with broad
national guidelines and local circumstances (Zhu, 2002; Reutersward, 2005, pp. 15-16).
There are now five social insurance schemes covering urban workers; of which, the two
main schemes are pension and medical insurance. The national regulations mandate that all
employers in urban areas must contribute between 15 to 30 per cent of payroll for pension
insurance with the precise amount varying between provinces. In Shanghai, for example, it is
22.5 per cent and on average, urban employees contribute 8 per cent of their wages for pension
insurance. Employers are also required to contribute 6 per cent of payroll for medical
insurance, while employees contribute on average 2 per cent of wages for medical insurance.
On average employers contribute 2 per cent of payroll for unemployment insurance and 1 per
cent of payroll for industrial injury and maternity insurance respectively. Employees contribute
1 per cent of their wages to unemployment insurance, but industrial injury and maternity
insurance are financed solely by employer contributions (see, further, Zhu, 2002; Whiteford,
2003).
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III. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON WORKER PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL WELFARE
COVERAGE IN CHINA
Most existing studies have analysed the attitudes of workers in SOEs and/or workers laid-off
from SOEs towards declining levels of social welfare. Bu and Xu (1999) examined attitude
changes among workers in two SOEs located in Shanghai using data collected in 1988 and 1994.
Their findings rejected the view that SOE workers have become alienated by the market reforms
because of the threat that it poses to their economic security. While aware that their enterprises
could no longer guarantee job security and provide comprehensive welfare benefits, Bu and Xu
(1999) found that workers had not lowered their dedication to the productive goals of the
enterprise and were still receptive to managerial authority. Mok et al. (2002) examined the
attitudes of workers in SOEs and workers laid-off from SOEs towards declining welfare
entitlements and increased job insecurity based on a questionnaire administered in 11 SOEs in
Beijing, Shenyang and Zhejiang between 1996 and 1999. Their results suggest that most laid-off
workers had limited access to social security benefits and few welfare entitlements, except
medical insurance. While Bu and Xu found no evidence of alienation, Mok et al. (2002, p. 411)
concluded that there is “evidence of the strong sense of destitution and betrayal experienced by
most state workers. ….. It is clear that the adoption of a market economy and the reforms
introduced in the industrial sector have marginalised state workers”.
Similar perception research is reported in Mok and He (1999), who examined changes in
living standards and perceptions of social protection based on interviews with workers in SOEs
and workers laid off from SOEs in Guangzhou in 1997. They reported that state workers
believe that their living standards have fallen behind those in the non-state sector and expressed
frustration with being forced to accept lower levels of social protection. Chan and Qiu (1999)
Table 2
Regulations Governing Contributions to Social Insurance
Source: “China’s White Paper on Social Security Reform”, 2004. Available at: http://service.china.org.cn/link/
wcm/Show_Text?info_id=106258&p_qry=social%20and%20security%20and%20system (Released
September, 2004).
Insurance
Basic old-age insurance
Unemployment insurance
Basic medical insurance
Work-related injury insurance
Maternity insurance
Contributions paid by enterprises
Not to exceed 20 per cent of the total wage
bill of the enterprise, with the specific
proportion being determined by local
governments.
Employers pay 2 per cent of their total
wage bill.
About 6 per cent of the total wage bill.
The government determines the
differential premium rates according to the
degree of risk of work-related injuries
involved in different sectors, and sets
several premium rates within each sector
according to the insurance payments and
occurrence rates of such injuries.
Should not be more than 1 per cent of the
total wage bill.
Contributions paid by individual
employees
Individual employees pay 8 per cent of their
wages, whereas self-employed individuals
and those who are employed in a flexible
manner in urban areas pay an amount equal
to about 18 per cent of the average wage in
their locality.
Individuals pay 1 per cent of their personal
wages.
2 per cent of the employee’s wage.
None
None
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examined the changing structure of social support in China, focussing on material aid and
guidance in job search. Their study was also based on a survey of laid-off workers in
Guangzhou and was administered at the same time as that of Mok and He (1999). Chan and
Qiu (1999) found that while SOEs still played an important part in workers’ economic lives,
informal social networks were playing an increasingly prominent role as a social buffer against
the insecurities of the market. Cook and Jolly (2002) explored the perceptions of workers laid-
off from the state-owned sector based on interviews conducted in three cities. Most of the
interviewees responded that they considered social security benefits to be inadequate and that
this had forced them to take lowly-paid jobs which they had formerly despised to make ends
meet; restrict their diet and spend less on educating their children and looking after their
elderly parents.
One study which examines perceptions of workers across ownership forms is Zhu et al.
(2005). These authors considered how attitudes towards social protection differ across
ownership forms based on a survey of 299 workers in enterprises of different ownership
categories administered in Shanghai in 2002. Of the respondents 32 per cent were in SOEs, 36
per cent were in foreign-invested enterprises, 19 per cent were in shareholding enterprises and
13 per cent were in privately-owned enterprises. Their main finding was that ownership form
does have a statistically significant effect on employee perception of social protection reform.
Relative to respondents in WFOEs, who were treated as the reference category, employees in
POEs and SHFs were statistically more likely to be satisfied with the new social protection
regulations while the satisfaction levels of employees in SOEs were statistically not different
from those in FIEs.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
While Zhu et al. (2005) extend the worker perception research beyond workers in SOEs, their
study is limited in two respects. First it focusses on the perceptions of workers in Shanghai,
which, because of Shanghai’s high income per capita, may not be typical of the rest of China.
The special place that Shanghai occupies in China’s market economy is self-evident in the size
of the city’s GDP which is almost twice that of Beijing and the largest of any Chinese city
(Zhang, 2003). Second, their sample size of 299 workers used in Zhu et al. (2005) is relatively
small. The empirical study here extends the research in Zhu et al. (2005) through using a larger
sample of workers from enterprises across six cities. With assistance from the Bureau of
Labour and Social Security in Jiangsu, in December 2003 we administered a survey to 885
urban workers in six cities in Jiangsu; namely, Nanjing, Suzhou, Kunshan, Yizheng, Chuzhou
and Changzhou. The survey was administered in nineteen enterprises in total, consisting of five
SOEs, five POEs, four IJVs, four SHFs and one WFOE. There were 860 valid responses. The
survey contained questions on both the level of coverage and satisfaction with social insurance
across ownership forms as well as information on the human capital (education and income)
and personal characteristics (age and gender) of the respondents.
1. Predicting Coverage of Social Insurance across Ownership Forms
Table 3 shows the level of coverage of the five social insurances across ownership forms
among workers in the sample. Overall, 90.5 per cent of workers were receiving pension
insurance, 70.7 per cent of workers were receiving medical insurance, 62.1 per cent of workers
were receiving unemployment insurance, 52.8 per cent of workers were receiving industrial
injury insurance and 42.7 per cent of female workers were receiving maternity insurance.
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These figures are higher than the official figures for the urban population as a whole. In 2003,
45 per cent of urban workers (including rural migrants) had pension insurance and 31 per cent
of urban workers (including rural migrants) had medical insurance) (Reutersward, 2005, p.
17). One reason for the lower official percentage figures is that they include rural migrants
where our sample only includes those with an urban registration. Previous research suggests
that social insurance coverage among rural migrants in urban areas is much lower (Nielsen et
al., 2005a). In the sample, the proportion of workers receiving pension, unemployment,
industrial injury and maternity insurance was highest in the WFOE, while the proportion of
workers receiving medical insurance was highest in SOEs. The proportion of workers
receiving pension and medical insurance was lowest in POEs, while SHFs and IJVs had the
lowest coverage for unemployment, industrial injury and maternity insurance.
Table 4
Predicting the Receipt of Pension Insurance from Firm Ownership Form
Ownership forma B Wald c2 p Odds ratio
WFOE 1.770 5.560 .018 5.871
POE -.708 4.358 .037 .493
IJV -.214 .391 .532 .807
SHF -.033 .010 .920 .968
Constant 2.308 96.860 .000
Note:a-The ownership form reference category is SOEs.
Table 5
Predicting the Receipt of Medical Insurance from Firm Ownership Form
Ownership forma B Wald c2 p Odds ratio
SHF -1.897 57.834 .000 .150
POE -2.009 51.251 .000 .134
IJV -.894 10.161 .001 .409
WFOE -.565 3.172 .075 .568
Constant 2.059 94.019 .000
Note: a-The ownership form reference category is SOEs.
Table 3
Social Insurance Coverage across Ownership Forms in Firms in the Jiangsu Survey, December 2003
Ownership form Pension Medical Unemployment Industrial injury Maternity
All forms 778 (90.5%) 607 (70.7%) 534 (62.1%) 454 (52.8%) 367 (42.7%)
WFOE 118 (98.3%)  98 (81.7%)  98 (81.7%)  91 (75.8%)  89 (74.2%)
SHF 214 (90.7%) 127 (54.0%) 100 (42.4%)  87 (36.9%)  69 (29.2%)
IJV 146 (89.0%) 125 (76.2%)  83 (50.6%)  86 (52.4%)  45 (27.4%)
POE  99 (83.2%)  61 (51.3%)  89 (74.8%)  85 (71.4%)  73 (61.3%)
SOE 201 (91.0%) 196 (88.7%) 164 (74.2%) 105 (47.5%)  91 (41.2%)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are within-ownership form employee percentages.
Tables 4 to 8 contain logit models where ownership form is used to predict receipt of each
of pension, medical, unemployment, industrial injury and maternity insurance. In each case the
reference category is SOEs. In Table 4 the coefficients on WFOEs and POEs are statistically
significant. The odds ratio suggests that workers in WFOEs are 5.9 times as likely to receive
pension insurance relative to workers in SOEs, while workers in POEs are half as likely as
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workers in SOEs to receive pension insurance. In Table 5, the coefficient on SHFs, POEs, IJVs
and WFOEs are all statistically significant with a negative sign, which reflects the relatively
high proportion of workers in SOEs covered by medical insurance. The odds ratios in Table 5
suggest that the likelihood of workers in SHFs and POEs receiving medical insurance is about
10 per cent that of workers in SOEs, while the likelihood of workers in IJVs and WFOEs
receiving medical insurance is about one half that of workers in SOEs receiving medical
insurance.
Table 6 shows the results from a logit model predicting the receipt of unemployment
insurance from firm ownership form. The coefficients on IJVs and SHFs are statistically
significant with a negative sign with the odds ratios suggesting that workers in IJVs and SHFs are
30 to 40 per cent as likely as workers in SOEs to receive unemployment insurance. In Table 7 the
coefficients on WFOEs and POEs are statistically significant with a positive sign while the
coefficient on SHFs is statistically significant with a negative sign. Workers in WFOEs are 3.5
times as likely as workers in SOEs to receive industrial injury insurance, workers in POEs are 2.8
times as likely as workers in SOEs to receive industrial injury insurance, while workers in SHFs
are 70 per cent as likely as workers in SOEs to receive industrial injury insurance. Table 8 shows
that workers in WFOEs and POEs are 4.1 times and 2.3 times as likely respectively to receive
maternity insurance relative to workers in SOEs, while workers in IJVs and WFOEs are 50 per
Table 6
Predicting the Receipt of Unemployment Insurance from Firm Ownership Form
Ownership forma B Wald c2 P Odds ratio
IJV -1.032 22.190 .000 .356
SHF -1.364 45.404 .000 .256
WFOE .437 2.409 .121 1.548
POE .031 .014 .907 1.031
Constant 1.057 47.242 .000
Note: a-The ownership form reference category is SOEs.
Table 7
Predicting the Receipt of Industrial Injury Insurance from Firm Ownership Form
Ownership forma B Wald c2 P Odds ratio
WFOE 1.243 24.295 .000 3.467
POE 1.016 17.398 .000 2.762
SHF -.438 5.288 .021 .645
IJV .197 .914 .339 1.218
Constant -.100 .547 .460
Note: a- The ownership form reference category is SOEs.
Table 8
Predicting the Receipt of Maternity Insurance from Firm Ownership Form
Ownership forma B Wald c2 P Odds ratio
WFOE 1.411 32.036 .000 4.101
POE .818 12.379 .000 2.267
IJV -.616 7.690 .006 .540
SHF -.527 7.097 .008 .590
Constant -.357 6.810 .009
Note: a-The ownership form reference category is SOEs; 2. Predicting satisfaction with social insurance across
ownership forms.
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for Predicting Satisfaction with Social Insurance
Variable Description Values
Satisfaction–overall Ordinal measure of satisfaction with social Mean=3.27
insurance: 1=not at all satisfied to 5=very satisfied (SD=1.01)
Median=3.00
Satisfaction–pension Nominal measure of satisfaction with pension insurance 1=48.5%
: 1=provides security; 2=costs outweigh benefits; 3=does 2=11.4%
not provide adequate security; 4=don’t know 3=12.9%
4=27.2%
Satisfaction–medical Nominal measure of satisfaction with medical 1=45.1%
insurance: 1=provides security; 2=costs outweigh 2=18.7%
benefits; 3=hard to satisfy criteria; 4=don’t know 3=17.1%
4=19.1%
Gender 0=female; 1=male 59.0% male
Age Age in years Mean age=33.38
years (SD=8.66)
min=18; max=68
Income Ordinal measure of income in 2002: 1=5000 RMB
and below to 6=30000 RMB and above Median = 3.00
(10001-15000)
Education Nominal measure of educational attainment: 1=junior JunMid=25.1%
middle school or below; 2=senior middle school; SenMid=30.6%
3=polytechnic education; 4=3 year higher degree or above Polytech=12.3%
HigherEd =32.0%
Ownership form Nominal measure of firm ownership: 1=WFOE; 2=SHF; WFOE=13.7%
3=IJV; 4=POE; 5=SOE SHF = 41.2%
IJV=19.1%
POE=14.6%
SOE=25.1%
cent to 60 per cent as likely to receive maternity insurance as workers in SOEs.
2. Predicting Satisfaction with Social Insurance across Ownership Forms
The questionnaire asked ‘Are you satisfied with the urban employees’ social insurance
scheme?’ where respondents answered on a five point scale with 1=not satisfied at all and
5=very satisfied. The questionnaire also asked whether respondents were satisfied with
medical insurance and pension insurance. In each case satisfaction was measured on a nominal
scale where 1=provides security; 2=costs outweigh benefits; 3=does not provide adequate
security; 4=don’t know. To explore the determinants of satisfaction with social insurance we
used an ordered logit model and to examine the determinants of satisfaction with medical and
pension insurance we used a multinomial logit model. For both the ordered logit and
multinomial logit models the predictors were age, gender, income, education and ownership
form. The definition of each of the variables and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 9.
Before turning to the results we briefly discuss the expected signs on the variables.
Beginning with ownership, as discussed above, social insurance reforms in China have
involved a trade-off where the level of social welfare support has fallen in the state sector, but
increased in the non-state sector. We expect this to be reflected in perceptions of satisfaction
levels with social insurance with the coefficients on WFOE, IJV, SHF and POE to be positive,
relative to SOE. Of the other variables, there is evidence of gender discrimination against
females in the provision of social insurance (Cooke, 2001). Thus we expect satisfaction levels
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with social insurance to be higher among males. The thrust of China’s social insurance reforms
has been to shift responsibility for social welfare provision from the state to the individual
(Nielsen et al., 2005; Zhu et al., 2005). Consequently, one would expect that those who are on
low incomes, those who are relatively less educated and those who are older would be more
vulnerable with a more competitive labour market which would accompany greater
marketisation as compared to younger workers, those on higher incomes and those with higher
levels of human capital.
We expect the relatively less educated, those on low incomes and older workers to be less
satisfied with a social insurance regime which shifts responsibilities from the state to the
individual (Duch, 1993). This expectation is consistent with the findings from studies for
China and post-socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, in a survey of
the concerns of 1223 households across eight cities, including Beijing, Guangzhou and
Shanghai, conducted by researchers at Nanjing University in 2002, low income and inadequate
social welfare among older residents was considered the major problem.1 Lokshin and
Ravallion (2000), among others, have found that marketisation in the transitional economies of
Central and Eastern Europe has resulted in a deterioration in the living standards of the aged
and this has generated resentment about declining or inadequate social welfare provision to
older people. Gerber (2000) found that the less educated and those on lower incomes are less
inclined to support market reform and be more concerned with social insurance, using Russian
data collected in the mid-1990s.
The results for predicting satisfaction with social insurance are reported in Table 10. With
the exception of age, which is statistically insignificant, the results are consistent with
expectations. The findings suggest that males and those on higher incomes are statistically
more likely to be satisfied with social insurance, while those in senior middle school and
polytechnic school are less likely to be satisfied with social insurance relative to those with a
three year higher education or above, which is the reference group. The coefficient on POE is
Table 10
Predicting Satisfaction with Social Insurance
Variable Coefficient Wald
Gender .392 4.512 **
Age .007 .489
Income .354 11.579 *
Junior middle school or below .117 .211
Senior middle school -.170 .536
Polytechnic school -.535 3.327 ***
WFOE 3.441 17.342 *
SHF 1.294 12.520 *
IJV .690 5.042 **
POE .132 .242
-2 Log likelihood (Unrestricted) 2068.874
-2 Log likelihood (Restricted) 1871.907
- 2LR statistic (20 df) 196.967❖
Number of observations 885
Note: *(**)(***) coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 99 per cent (95per cent)(90 per cent)
level of significance; ❖ coefficient on -2LR statistic is statistically different from zero at the 99 per
cent level of significance. The reference category for ownership form is SOEs. The reference category
for education is 3 year higher degree or higher.
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statistically insignificant, but workers in WFOEs, SHFs and IJVs are statistically more likely to
be satisfied with social insurance than workers in SOEs.
The results of the multinomial logit model for predicting satisfaction with pension insurance
are given in Table 11. The findings suggest that gender and income predict “satisfaction with
pension insurance because it provides security” relative to those who do not know whether they
are satisfied, which is the reference category, with the expected sign. Those with a polytechnic
education are less likely to be satisfied with pension insurance because it provides security than
those with a three year higher degree or above, but the coefficients on the junior middle school or
below and senior middle school variables are statistically insignificant. The results for the
ownership variable are similar to Table 10 with workers in WFOEs, SHFs and IJVs statistically
more likely to be satisfied with pension insurance because it provides security than workers in
SOEs. Turning to the reasons as to why respondents were not satisfied with pension insurance,
workers in IJVs and POEs were more likely to be less satisfied with pension insurance than
workers in SOEs on the basis that the costs outweigh the benefits, while workers in WFOEs and
SHFs were less likely to be less satisfied with pension insurance than workers in SOEs on the
basis that pension insurance does not provide adequate security for old age.
Table 12 reports the results of the multinomial model predicting satisfaction with medical
insurance where the reference group is respondents who do not know. The findings indicate
that males are statistically more likely to be satisfied with medical insurance on the basis that it
provides security, but, at the same time, be statistically more likely to be not satisfied with
medical insurance on the basis that the costs outweigh the benefits. Older workers and workers
with higher incomes are statistically more likely to be satisfied with medical insurance because
it provides security, while being statistically more likely to be not satisfied with medical
insurance on the grounds that the costs outweigh the benefits and that it is hard to satisfy the
criteria. The results for the ownership variable suggest that workers in WFOEs, SHFs and
POEs are statistically more likely to be satisfied with medical insurance because it provides
security than workers in SOEs. At the same time, workers in WFOEs and SHFs are statistically
less likely to be not satisfied with medical insurance on the basis that the costs outweigh the
benefits or it is hard to satisfy the criteria relative to workers in SOEs.
3. Discussion of the Results
There are two interesting features of the coverage figures reported in Tables 3-8. The first is the
relatively high level of social insurance coverage in the WFOE. The WFOE had the highest
proportion of workers receiving pension, unemployment, industrial injury and maternity
insurance. Previous research has suggested that social insurance coverage, or at least pension
insurance coverage, is much lower in WFOEs. According to figures reported in Gao (2001,
p.132), in 2000 95.2 per cent of SOEs participated in pension insurance in comparison with
just 27.5 per cent of WFOEs who paid pension insurance to their employees. A report in the
Workers’ Daily (2005) states that a survey by the Guangdong Statistical Bureau in 2004 of 600
non-state enterprises in Guangdong found that 57 per cent of WFOEs (from outside ‘Greater
China’) and 48.6 per cent of WFOEs from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan participated in
pension insurance. The same report states in order to attract foreign direct investment, some
local governments in Guangdong have declared that WFOEs and IJVs do not have to
participate in social insurance. One reason for the high level of social insurance coverage for
WFOEs found in this study is that some WFOEs, especially those from western developed
countries, transfer their country’s ‘best practice’ in workforce management (Chan, 2001).
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These WFOEs often pay supplementary commercial insurance to their workers as a human
resource strategy to attract and retain the best staff. This has been well documented in Shanghai
case studies (Zhu and Nyland, 2004). The proviso to our conclusions is that how widespread
this practice actually is cannot be determined from the data presented here because only one
WFOE was included in the survey.
A second interesting feature of Table 3 is that the level of coverage in POEs appears high
Table 11
Predicting Satisfaction with Pension Insurance
Variable levela Coefficient Wald
Satisfied, provides security
Gender .392 4.512 **
Age .007 .489
Income .354 11.579 *
Junior middle school or below .117 .211
Senior middle school -.170 .536
Polytechnic school -.535 3.327 ***
WFOE 3.441 17.342 *
SHF 1.294 12.520 *
IJV .690 5.042 **
POE .132 .242
Not satisfied, costs
outweigh benefits
Gender -.247 .815
Age -.005 .105
Income .088 .679
Junior middle school or below -.128 .110
Senior middle school -.117 .114
Polytechnic school -.039 .008
WFOE -.590 .519
SHF .016 .001
IJV .963 6.272 **
POE .741 3.507 ***
Not satisfied, does not
provide adequate security
Gender .196 .571
Age -.011 .440
Income .153 2.216
Junior middle school or below -.380 .801
Senior middle school .175 .284
Polytechnic school .482 1.526
WFOE -2.295 4.616 **
SHF -1.005 6.447 **
IJV -.553 2.204
POE -.309 .714
-2 Log likelihood (Unrestricted) 1861.715
-2 Log likelihood (Restricted) 1678.849
- 2LR statistic (30 df) 182.866❖
Number of observations 885
Note: a: The reference level is “don’t know”; *(**)(***) coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 99
per cent (95 per cent)(90 per cent) level of significance; ❖ coefficient on -2LR statistic is statistically
different from zero at the 99 per cent level of significance. The reference category for ownership form
is SOEs. The reference category for education is 3 year higher degree or higher.
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across the board relative to what previous research has suggested. Overall the level of social
insurance coverage in POEs in the sample is better than expected. Zhu and Nyland (2004)
reported that in Shanghai while POEs are supposed to provide the same social insurance coverage
as other ownership forms, social insurance evasion is more common in POEs than in IJVs, SHFs,
SOEs or WFOEs. Zhu et al. (2005, pp. 153-154) stated thus: “One respondent [whom they
interviewed in Shanghai] commented … that one of the problems with the system was that many
POEs simply ignored the new social security policies”. Similar tendencies have been reported in
research for Beijing. BSPRI (2003) examined the level of social insurance provided to residents
of Beijing in 2001 and 2002 by administering a survey to 1000 respondents across eight districts
Table 12
Predicting Satisfaction with Medical Insurance
Variable levela Coefficient Wald
Satisfied, provides security
Gender .416 3.537 ***
Age .035 6.710 *
Income .383 17.209 *
Junior middle school or below -.050 .024
Senior middle school -.249 .688
Polytechnic school -.476 1.654
WFOE 2.301 27.958 *
SHF .790 5.761 **
IJV .445 1.465
POE .808 4.749 **
Not satisfied, costs
outweigh benefits
Gender .450 3.053 ***
Age .029 3.195 ***
Income .211 4.016 **
Junior middle school or below -.237 .377
Senior middle school .146 .196
Polytechnic school -.388 .872
WFOE -2.074 6.415 **
SHF -1.349 12.744 *
IJV -.050 .019
POE -.403 1.070
Not satisfied, hard
to satisfy criteria
Gender .087 .106
Age .028 2.869***
Income .203 3.642***
Junior middle school or below -.459 1.357
Senior middle school -.421 1.499
Polytechnic school -.374 .847
WFOE -1.688 5.674**
SHF -1.687 18.034*
IJV -.522 1.896
POE -.544 1.956
-2 Log likelihood (Unrestricted) 1952.005
-2 Log likelihood (Restricted) 1709.852
- 2LR statistic (20 df) 242.153❖
Number of observations 885
Note: Same as for Table 11.
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of the city.2 The survey found that as compared to workers in other ownership forms, workers in
POEs had the lowest level of social insurance coverage; 25 per cent of respondents from POEs
reported that they received no social insurance at all and a further 14 per cent of respondents from
POEs reported that they did not know whether they were covered by social insurance. The survey
by the Guangdong Statistics Bureau, discussed earlier, found that in 226 private enterprises, only
39 per cent of employees had joined pension insurance (Workers’ Daily, 2005). Tables 4 to 8 show
that while workers in POEs are statistically less likely than workers in SOEs to receive medical
and pension insurance, workers in POEs are more likely to receive industrial injury and maternity
insurance relative to workers in SOEs.
Turning to the models predicting satisfaction with social insurance, workers in SHFs and
WFOEs are consistently more likely to be satisfied with social insurance as a whole as well
as pension and medical insurance considered in isolation relative to workers in SOEs.
Workers in IJVs are statistically more likely than workers in SOEs to be satisfied with social
insurance as a whole, although the findings for pension insurance for IJVs are mixed.
Workers in IJVs are more likely to be satisfied with pension insurance than workers in SOEs
because it provides security, but less likely to be satisfied with pension insurance when
weighing up the benefits and costs. The relatively high level of satisfaction in WFOEs across
the board relative to SOEs is likely to partly reflect the high proportion of workers in WFOEs
who have social insurance coverage. Another factor contributing to the high levels of
reported satisfaction in WFOEs is likely to be that WFOEs also often offer employees
additional benefits over and above basic social insurance such as higher salaries, better
learning environment (Zhu et al., 2005), housing allotments and stock options (Hickey,
2003; Zhao, 2003; Zhu and Nyland, 2004).
Satisfaction levels among workers in POEs are mixed. The coefficient on POEs in the
social insurance ordered logit is statistically insignificant. In the pension insurance
multinomial logit workers in POEs are less satisfied than workers in SOEs on the basis that the
costs outweigh the benefits while in the medical insurance multinomial logit workers in POEs
are more satisfied than workers in SOEs because it provides security. As discussed above while
the level of coverage in POEs seems relatively high across the board, of the various ownership
forms POEs had the lowest pension and medical coverage. It is interesting that workers in
POEs are less satisfied than workers in SOEs on pensions where 83.2 per cent of workers in
POEs were covered, while workers in POEs were more satisfied than workers in SOEs on
medical insurance where just 51.3 per cent of workers in POEs were covered. One explanation
for this finding is that the expectation of coverage for pension insurance is higher than medical
insurance. Another explanation for the results for satisfaction with medical insurance is that
workers in POEs have low expectations when it comes to social insurance. Because social
insurance coverage in POEs has traditionally been low or non-existent, workers in POEs might
appreciate any form of social protection such as medical insurance which they can get.
V. SOCIAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS IN INDIA
The current social protection regime in India is far less developed than is that extant in China.
Indeed, expenditure on social services in India is small as compared to that in developing
countries in general. However, in advancing this assessment it is important to note that there is
marked diversity across the states of India and in recent years reforms have been implemented
that are designed to extend social protection coverage (Varma, Undated). Moreover, even the
limited security regime that has been established has been of importance to the people assisted
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and to the nation. That the latter is the case is evidenced by Justino (2003) who undertook an
empirical analysis of the effects of socio-economic security policies on India’s economic
performance between 1973 and 1999. Using a two-stage least square model adapted to data
from a panel of 14 Indian states, she has shown that “policies that strengthen the social and
economic security of the Indian population have been an important endogenous variable to
both the reduction of poverty and the economic growth in India” (ibid., p. 2)
Justino (2003) has also argued that a heightened awareness of the contribution that a sound
social security regime can make to economic growth became manifest in the 1990s within
India as a direct consequence of the structural reforms implemented since 1991 with the
guidance of the IMF. This claim probably has some validity but if so there would appear to
have been a lagged effect given an appreciation of the association between social protection
and globalisation does not become patent in Indian economic literature until the new
millennium. Possibly, the new awareness also reflects the heightened appreciation of the
globalisation social security nexus that has become widespread within the economics
discipline. Important in generating this sensitivity has been the work of Rodrik (1998a and
1998b). The latter has argued that if governments choose to open their economies it is vital that
they underpin this process with social institutions that can cushion their populations from the
shocks generated by market volatility. In support of this proposition, he provided robust
empirical evidence that indicated that where governments have liberalised their economies
without an effective social protection regime they have found repeatedly that while
marketisation accelerates growth it does not guarantee that this growth will be sustained when
the economy is subjected to significant shock and it becomes necessary to adopt painful
policies to counter the consequent instability. In short, when states open their economies to the
volatility of global markets, but do not insure the populace against market volatility by
providing an effective social protection regime, they commonly find it difficult to raise taxes,
cut wages and benefits, raise interest rates, etcetera. This was a message driven home, in the
same year that Rodrik’s highly influential papers appeared, by the social disaster generated by
the Asian financial crisis. Together, these developments led Asian ADB (2001) to observe that
there is a need to underpin market liberalisation and globalisation with a sound social
protection regime (though Saramatunge and Nyland (2004) have identified a significant gap
between the social protection rhetoric and practice of the international financial agencies).
According to ADB (2001, p.32):
Globalisation, while increasing the opportunities for growth, will also increase the country’s
vulnerability to external shocks, and the risk of increased unemployment and poverty and likely
political instability. Most of the political reaction against globalisation is a result of the absence
of adequate social protection systems, which makes implementation of reforms very difficult
given that populations may have to pay the costs of reform in the short term. Globalisation
requires the development of effective social protection systems. The world’s forward looking
development agendas give social protection a primary role to sustain growth and well
functioning markets.
Sensitivity to the association between social protection and market openness has also been
stimulated by an emergent awareness that there exists a need to systematically explore how
labour market flexibility, productivity and global competitiveness interact. Within the OECD
this became an issue of sustained economic and policy debate as it became apparent that an
intellectual gulf has long existed between social security experts on the one hand and their
colleagues involved in designing and implementing labour market policy on the other. As
Hoskins (2001, p. xxii) has noted:
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This divide subsequently became even more marked as social security programmes undertook
increasingly significant reforms while many of the OECD countries struggled to reduce
unemployment and encourage their labour forces to become more flexible. Questions were
raised on both sides about the ways the different sets of public policy interacted and influenced
outcomes, either negatively or positively.
To confront both this problem and the need to explore the link between globalisation and
social security, the International Social Security Association (ISSA) launched a major research
programme in 2000. This is seeking to build bridges between social policy experts and labour
economists (Sarfati and Bonoli, 2002). It is a development that has been sustained and
extended by a stream of publications from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that
have stressed that policy makers need to recognise that social protection must be deemed a
fundamental pillar of an effective globalisation strategy (World Commission on the Social
Dimension of Globalisation, 2004).
Indian scholars have actively embraced the recent exploration of the association between
social protection, marketisation and globalisation. An indication of how marked is the
emphasis now being placed on global risk management is attained by contrasting Dev et al.
(eds.) (2001) with more recent works. Dev et al. (eds.) (ibid.) reviewed key elements of India’s
social protection regime and sought to conceptualise what social security should mean in
developing countries. In so doing, the editors observed that the ILO’s definition of social
security is limited because it assumes societies have already reached an acceptable standard of
living and that the goal of social security protection is to safeguard this standard. They rightly
argue that these assumptions are invalid in countries such as India where very few working
people have regular employment or receive an adequate income. Given this situation, they
conclude that it is clear that developing nations need an approach to social security that
encompasses not only the protection of existing rights but also involves promotional elements
that can extend social and economic security to all. The case advanced by Dev et al. (eds.)
(2001) is certainly valid. Nevertheless, it was criticised by Unni (2002) for failing to provide an
overall framework in which to locate the various arguments contained in the volume. But what
is noticeable in the latter’s critique is that in an age of globalisation she did not note that the
Dev et al. (eds.) (2001) had not discussed the fact that open market economies need to be
underpinned by a sound social protection regime.
But while an overt and explicit awareness of the importance of the association between
globalisation, market openness and social security is not easily discernible in Indian economics
and policy until recently, there has been a marked change in recent years. Important efforts that
have contributed to this change and that have the link between globalisation and social
protection at the very centre of the analysis include GoI (2002); Varma (Undated); and the
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation (2004).
The gathering debate on the association between social protection and market
liberalisation and globalisation flowered fully in 2004 with the publication of three important
works: Deshpande et al.(2004), Sankhdher and Jain (2004), and Agarwala et al. (eds.) (2004).
All of these works have sought to highlight the need for India to underpin its re-entrance into
the global market with a sound social protection regime. That there is a great space between
this awareness and what is happening on the ground, however, has been highlighted by Papola
(2004, pp. 547-548) who has expressed “serious concern” at the coverage and level of social
protection available to Indian workers. Indeed, he laments that the prevailing dire situation
appears if anything to be declining due not least to the fact that the formal sector of the
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economy is shrinking. In concluding what is an encompassing discussion of globalisation,
employment and social protection Papola (ibid., pp. 547-548) observes that delaying the
provision of social protection will not enhance the overall well being of the Indian worker and
situate India on to a sustained high growth path. Indeed, he warns that: “…unless measures are
taken to provide a degree of social protection and ensure minimum standards now, there is a
likelihood of ‘race to the bottom’ taking place from where it would become difficult to start an
upward movement in labour standards”.
VI. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Our study of perceptions of social protection among China’s urban workers reveals that
satisfaction levels with social protection are generally statistically higher among workers in
SHFs, IJVs and WFOEs than in SOEs. This is a result that needs to be situated alongside those
perception studies that have concentrated on the views of state sector workers and found a great
many of these employees feel betrayed by the party-state in China and believe their welfare has
been undermined by the marketisation and globalisation processes. Given the growing proportion
of the workforce that is employed in the non-state sector, the results generated by our study may
help explain the broad popular support for marketisation that we have found expressed by
urbanites across China’s cities. However, until studies can be undertaken that encompass a larger
body of firms and a broader geographical cross-section than is included in this study, caution will
be needed with conclusions of this nature.
Caution is also needed when drawing implications from China’s experience for other
countries. However, some observations may be advanced that may be of interest to an Indian
audience given the current debates being undertaken in India on the relationship between social
security, labour flexibility and global competitiveness.
First, China initiated its programme of social protection reform at a relatively early stage in
its turn to the market and global openness. Though advancing with care and seeking to ensure
its social protection programmes are compatible with the country’s level of development, the
government did not wait until it had drawn well ahead of its global competitors or until the
nation had attained a high GDP before beginning the process of building a broadly based social
protection regime for workers in urban areas compatible with a market economy. There can be
no doubt that what has been established to replace the comprehensive system that existed under
the command economy, even in the urban centres, remains seriously deficient and this is much
more the case in the rural areas. Nevertheless, it remains the case that China is putting a welfare
regime in place and is doing so even while its per capita national income ensures that it is
rightly described as a developing country.
Second, on comparing the mandated social protection system imposed on employers and
workers in India and China respectively, it is clear that the share of the urban workforce to
whom social protection has been extended is much higher in China than it is in India and that
the proportion of the total wage bill firms must commit to social protection is also higher. This
is notable not least because despite the fact that its firms have to meet these costs, China
nevertheless has been able to sustain a higher rate of economic growth than has India and as a
consequence has pulled markedly ahead while concomitantly extending the scope of its market
oriented social protection regime. For those currently engaged in the debates surrounding
labour market flexibility and international competitiveness this application of mandated
employment conditions is a development that needs to be accorded due heed.
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Third, the coincidence between the social protection trend line and the level of popular
support for market liberalisation in urban India and China respectively needs to be noted. In
China concern that globalisation and marketisation might be undermined by social unrest has
been a critical factor motivating the government to steadily but continually extend the coverage of
social security in urban areas while concomitantly continuing to push forward the globalisation
and marketisation processes. We suggest that by carefully managing this balancing act, China has
been able to sustain popular support for marketisation, while concomitantly retrenching millions
of jobs in the state sector, imposing an increased share of the cost of social insurance on the
population, and subjecting urban workers to unprecedented levels of market vulnerability. This is
a feat that compares favourably with the concern with globalisation that was expressed by the
electorate in India in the 2004 national elections and lends weight to Rodrik’s argument.
Fourth, it is important that those participating in the debate surrounding the relationship
between social protection, labour flexibility, and global competitiveness remain very conscious
of how labour markets and social protection interact.
Finally, and returning to the central issue that has been the primary focus of this paper, the
last lesson that might usefully be noted from our study is that when studying perceptions of
labour market and social policy reform Indian researchers might usefully remember to include
ownership form alongside such variables as size of enterprise, industry type, and whether
employees are part of the formal or informal economy when studying the association between
social protection and marketisation. At least in the Chinese case, taking into account ownership
form provides a more rounded perspective on what urban workers really think about changing
social insurance coverage and helps to debunk the myth that China’s social welfare reforms
contain all negatives for its urban workforce.
Notes
1. See http://www.minyi.org.cn/sqmy//sqmy040217-5.htm
2. See the survey results, available at http://www.chinaminyi.org.cn
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